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The Paradox of the Baltic States:
Labour Market Flexibility but
Protected Workers?
ABSTRACT ▪ This article assesses the strictness of employment protection
legislation and its actual enforcement in the Baltic States. We use information
from the applicable legislation as well as employer surveys, data on the
coverage of labour legislation and the practice of law enforcement. Overall
strictness is close to the average of EU countries and relatively well aligned
with EU regulations; individual and collective dismissals are relatively heavily
and temporary forms of employment relatively weakly regulated. However,
effective flexibility is increased by problems of enforcement: there is much
evidence of violations of statutory regulations at enterprise level. In addition,
the proportion of the workforce actually covered by the regulations is
relatively low. In the Baltic States temporary employment is more widespread,
implying a higher level of flexibility than the EU average.
Introduction
A key determinant of labour market flexibility is employment protection
legislation (EPL). This includes protection against dismissals, limitations
on temporary forms of employment, and more broadly regulation of
working time and health and safety. Such regulations are viewed posi-
tively by those defined by Freeman (1993) as ‘institutionalists’, for whom
EPL is necessary to offset the weak bargaining position of employees,
protect against the risk of unemployment, moderate effects of down-
swings in aggregate demand and enhance investments in human capital
(and thus productivity growth). By contrast, ‘distortionists’ argue that
EPL increases labour market dualism by favouring insiders, increases
effective labour costs, discourages hiring and impedes adjustment to
economic shocks.
In this article we estimate the strictness of EPL, and its actual enforce-
ment, in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and more
specifically the Baltic States. Under a centrally planned economy,
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workers in CEE enjoyed a high degree of employment protection
(Kuddo, 1995). Together with high wage compression this led to extreme
labour market rigidity and inefficiency. In the 1990s, rapid structural
adjustment in the transition economies was reflected in drastic amend-
ments to national EPL. This was particularly significant because trade
unions — an alternative mechanism of employment regulation — are
weak and often absent in many CEE enterprises.
The Baltic States form a special regional cluster. They have made
remarkable progress in restructuring the economy, reorienting to new
markets and reallocating resources to new sectors. We thus investigate
how far this has been enabled by labour flexibility, and to what extent
labour market regulation accords with EU norms. Several studies have
reported very high labour market flexibility in the Baltic States, particu-
larly in Estonia (Eamets et al., 2003; Haltiwanger and Vodopivec, 1999;
Juraida and Terrell, 2001; Paas et al., 2003). One of our tasks is to investi-
gate how workers are actually protected in this very flexible framework.
Much of the literature on labour market flexibility in CEE countries
has been very narrow in the data used. We apply a broader analysis,
including the share of the workforce covered by regulations; violations
of the legal provisions in enterprises and the procedures of enforcement
agencies. Our empirical analysis of labour laws is based on the OECD
methodology (Nicoletti et al., 2000; OECD, 1999). Unfortunately the
available aggregate measures of EPL strictness neglect some aspects of
legislation, e.g. the regulation of overtime. In order to analyse the
enforcement of regulations, we use data from national labour inspec-
torates and courts, the survey by the European Foundation and the
worldwide Executive Opinion Survey by the World Economic Forum
(Global Competitiveness Report, 2001–2002).
Concept and Measurement of Labour Market Flexibility
From the point of view of general equilibrium theory, the flexibility of
labour markets may be understood as the speed with which they adjust
to the external shocks and changing macroeconomic conditions in order
to achieve Pareto-efficient resource allocation. This definition is very
broad and it is difficult to measure empirically such effects as adjustment
speed. Most analyses therefore focus on labour market regulations and
institutions that are assumed to inhibit adjustment (Berthold and Fehn,
1996; Jackman et al., 1996; Lazear, 1990; Siebert, 1997). In all OECD
countries, there are rules and regulations that govern the employment
relationship. Those defined as EPL consist of laws and administrative
procedures governing unfair dismissals, restrictions on lay-offs for
economic reasons, compulsory severance payments, and minimum notice
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(1)
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periods. Whether and to what extent job security regulations affect
labour market flexibility remains a matter of continuing controversy.
Critics have claimed that strong EPL prevents employers from adjusting
to economic fluctuations, and that by preventing layoffs during down-
turns, job security provisions inhibit employers from hiring during
upturns, thus increasing unemployment (OECD, 1999). A counter-
argument is that EPL encourages long-term employment relationships,
leading employers to invest in more training. Enhanced skills in turn
boost labour productivity and may also increase internal (functional)
flexibility (Piore, 1986).
Various empirical studies in western Europe (Bentolila and Saint Paul,
1992; Bertola, 1990; Grubb and Wells, 1993) have concluded that the extent
of EPL results in relatively inflexible labour markets. However, Baker et
al. (2002) conclude that empirical findings do not support the common
argument that deregulation improves labour market performance. They
stress that it is even less evident that further weakening of social and collec-
tive protections for workers will have a significant positive impact on
employment prospects. Hence there is no clear agreement in the literature
on the interaction between EPL and labour market performance.
In our view, labour market flexibility should be measured at two
different levels: the macro level and the micro-level (Eamets, 2004). The
former can be further divided into institutional flexibility (the extent to
which state institutions and trade unions are involved in the regulation of
the labour market) and wage flexibility (how responsive wages are to
market fluctuations). Micro flexibility relates to the flows of workers (tran-
sitions between labour market states, occupational mobility and geograph-
ical mobility) and by jobs flows (job creation and job destruction).
These different aspects of flexibility can be assumed to be related. If insti-
tutional involvement is very high, workers’ transition rates are likely to be
low. If trade unions are weak, then wages are more flexible etc. Thus there
are likely to be important complementary or interaction effects which
condition the labour market impact of EPL (Belot and van Ours, 2000).
Employment protection encompasses any regulation, through law or
collective bargaining, which limits the employers’ ability to dismiss a
worker (Pissarides, 2001). In this article we concentrate on legal
measures. These can regulate a variety of issues: hiring standards;
dismissal rights; notice requirements for severance; administrative
requirements for layoffs; fixed term contracts; temporary agency work;
and collective dismissals. Some regulations are designed to cushion the
effect of a fall in demand for labour while others are to protect employ-
ees from arbitrary dismissals; some imply transfers from employer to
employee (notice and severance pay), others are a form of tax to imposing
a cost (procedural requirements).
Different indicators have been used to assess the strictness of EPL
Eamets & Masso: The Paradox of the Baltic States
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provisions. The best known is from Lazear (1990): the statutory compen-
sation in case of no-fault individual dismissal for economic reasons.
Summary indicators of strictness obtained by compressing the information
from a list of detailed indicators greatly facilitate the analysis of EPL, but
their construction raises difficult choices of quantification and weighting
and both ordinal and cardinal approaches have been used. Grubb and Wells
(1993) and OECD (1994) first computed a rank for each of the first-level
indicators for each country in the sample of countries under investigation,
then calculating the average of these ranks across indicators. But this can
lead to implausible results if national rankings differ too much across basic
indicators, and it is difficult to update the information and evaluate changes
in EPL over time. The OECD (1999) developed cardinal summary indi-
cators allowing somewhat more meaningful comparisons (though still
open to criticism) across countries and over time. Since the theoretical
analysis emphasises the analogy of EPL to taxation on employment adjust-
ment to be paid by the employer, the overall intent was to reflect the cost
implications of various regulatory provisions.
Research developed indices based on surveys of employers, assessing
the restrictions they perceive in dismissing workers (OECD, 1999).
Surveys of employers from a rather long list of countries are also included
in the economic freedom indexes by World Competitiveness Report,
Fraser Institute, the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal and
Freedom House (Addison and Texeira, 2001). Finally, Heckman and
Pages (2000) tried to calculate the costs of complying with EPL by
creating a job security index to measure the expected future cost, at the
time of hiring, of dismissing the worker for economic reasons.
Despite methodological advances, these indices remain open to criti-
cism. It is unclear what is the estimated effect of a unit increase/decrease
in the labour law index on some labour market performance variable, or
what are the causes of any change, and Bertola et al. (2000) have empha-
sized several other drawbacks (the failure of indices to capture atypical
forms of employment and that they ignore the links between EPL and
other labour market institutions).
EPL Strictness in the Baltic States and CEE Countries
We estimate the strictness of EPL in three areas: regular employment
(indefinite duration), temporary employment and regulation of collective
dismissals. As well as comparing legislation in 2002, we take account of
changes over time. Data for the Baltic States are based on analysis of
national legislation, and for other CEE countries are from Riboud et al.
(2002) and OECD (1999). We note that in the Baltic countries these 
regulations do not apply to civil servants, whose status is regulated 
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(1)
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separately. The calculations follow the methods used in the OECD
Employment Outlook (1999) and by Nicoletti et al. (2000). The final
measure of indices varies from 0 (flexible EPL) to 6 (strict legislation).
Table 1 summarizes previous information.
This reveals that EPL strictness in Baltic States and in CEE countries
more generally is close to the EU average, though high compared to the
USA (and many other OECD countries). That is because in the 1990s the
transition countries established various forms of EPL similar to continen-
tal European practice (Riboud et al., 2002). There are still steps to be taken
to enforce the labour law acquis in certain areas (e.g. gender equality) in the
Baltic States, but in general the implementation of EU labour law is well
advanced.1 The regulation of collective dismissals is perhaps even stricter
than the minimum required; that of fixed term employment was not
entirely in compliance with the directive 99/70/EC in the old codes (in
particular, the measures against the abuse of successive fixed-term
contracts), but the new codes (adopted in Latvia and Lithuania in 2002 and
2003 respectively, still in draft in Estonia) are more in line.
Not all components of EPL contribute equally to the cross-country
variation in strictness. In Latvia dismissals are less regulated than in
Estonia and Lithuania; the average in the Baltic States is higher than for
the EU15 (2.8 as against 2.4). The differences in the regulation of
temporary employment reflect a rule still in force in Estonia and Lithua-
nia, inherited from the Soviet Union, that workers can be engaged on
temporary contracts for up to 5 years, while Latvia reduced the limit to
2 years in 2002. The relatively loose regulation of regular employment in
Latvia is mainly due to shorter advance notice of economic dismissals and
smaller severance payments.
The use of temporary employment is significantly less restricted in the
Eamets & Masso: The Paradox of the Baltic States
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TABLE 1. Summary Indicators of EPL Strictness 
Strictness indicators (0–6)a
ILO conventions Regular Temporary Collective Overall EPL
ratified contracts contracts dismissals strictness
Latvia 45 2.8/2.3 3.2/2.1 4.0 3.3/2.5
Lithuania 34 1.8/3.0 1.1/1.4 4.9 1.1/2.7
Estonia 31 2.3/3.1 2.2/1.4 4.5 2.2/2.6
CEE average 62 2.5/2.7 0.8/1.2 4.1 1.7/2.4
CEE cvb 31% 25/16% 125/87% 12% 47/24%
EU15 88 2.4/2.6 2.3/2.3 3.2 2.4/2.5
USA 14 0.1/0.2 0.3/0.3 2.9 0.2/0.7
Notes: a Nicoletti et al. (2001), OECD (1999). Collective dismissals: OECD only.
b Coefficient of variation.
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Baltic States and other CEE countries than the EU15. In Lithuania and
Estonia the use of temporary employment is less restricted than in Latvia.
This is mostly due to the lack of regulations on the use of temporary
work agencies in most CEE countries. Though the law allows fixed-term
contracts for short-term temporary work only, at least in Estonia there
is anecdotal evidence that this restriction is not enforced.
In all Baltic countries the regulation of collective dismissals is even
stricter than the EU15 average, mainly because of strict notification
requirements and lengthy cooling-off periods. In Estonia some of the
changes in legislation since 2002 have made collective dismissals more
costly, increasing the value of the index from 2.6 to 4.5, but others have
decreased it; in particular, severance payments in case of collective
dismissals are now covered not by employers but by the unemployment
insurance fund. Indeed, many enterprises postponed dismissals until
these provisions came into force.
Enforcement of EPL
Previous literature on labour market flexibility in CEE countries (Cazes,
2002; Orenstein and Wilkens, 2001; Riboud et al., 2002; Svejnar, 2002) has
focused on formal legislation (measured by the OECD EPL strictness
index), and neglected the actual enforcement of these regulations. Even
strict labour laws may have little effect, if economic agents violate them,
if law enforcement agencies are weak or if these laws cover only a small
proportion of the total workforce, as Betcherman et al. (2001) argue is
the case in many developing countries. This is also relevant for transition
economies. For example, in Estonia there is anecdotal evidence that
employers force redundancies to be classified as voluntary terminations,
thus avoiding statutory compensation payments. More generally, the
Working Life Barometer (WLB) for the Baltic Countries (Antila and
Ylöstalo, 2002) show that employers can press employees to waive their
statutory rights in respect of dismissal.
The frequency of such derogations declined in Estonia from 10 to 6 per
cent of new contracts between 1998 and 2002; but Latvia and Lithuania
saw an opposite trend, increasing from 6 to 9 per cent and 4 to 9 per cent,
respectively. However, Antila and Ylöstalo (2002) argue that since many
respondents (15 per cent) declined to answer this question, the actual
frequency of waiver clauses could be higher than indicated.
Labour market flexibility is also affected by the proportion of the
workforce with ‘standard’ employment contracts, since these are
normally most strictly covered by EPL. Table 2 indicates the prevalence
of different types of employment contract in the Baltic States compared
with other CEE countries and the EU15.
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(1)
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TABLE 2. Different Types of Employment Status (%), 2001
Self-employed Regular Fixed term Temporary All Part-time EPL strictness, EPL strictness,
and other contracts contracts agency temporary work standard temporary
(unlimited contracts contracts employment employment
duration) (and adjusted)
Latvia 13.7 55.4 20.1 5.7 25.8 10 2.3 (1.3) 2.1
Lithuania 19.7 62.9 13.8 0.4 14.2 11 3.0 (1.9) 1.4
Estonia 10.1 75.6 10.7 1.2 11.9 8 3.1 (2.3) 1.4
Baltic States 14.5 64.6 14.9 2.4 17.3 9 2.8 (1.8) 1.6
Bulgaria 17.4 56.4 20.7 1.4 14.5 10 2.8 (1.6) 2.7
Czech Republic 15.9 72.1 9.5 0.9 10.4 8 2.8 (2.0) 0.5
Hungary 17.4 73.4 8.4 0.0 8.4 6 2.1 (1.5) 0.6
Poland 33.5 54.8 7.8 2.5 10.3 6 2.2 (1.2) 1.0
Slovakia 12.7 75.0 10.6 0.8 11.4 7 2.6 (2.0) 1.4
Slovenia 21.9 66.7 10.1 0.0 10.1 9 3.4 (2.3) 2.4
CEE average 18.0 65.8 12.4 1.4 13.0 8.2 2.7 (1.8) 1.5
EU15 16.6 68.1 8.3 1.8 10.1 18 2.6 (1.8) 2.3
Source: own calculations; European Foundation (2001), Franco and Jouhette (2002).
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Previous studies have shown that stricter EPL is associated with higher
shares of self-employment (OECD, 1999), but our data do not confirm
this. Self-employment in the Baltic States is only slightly below that in
the EU15 (14.5 and 16.6 per cent respectively). A more important influ-
ence appears to be the size of the agricultural sector, which can explain
why the share of self-employment is 19 per cent in Lithuania as against
only 10 per cent in Estonian. Table 2 shows that across the CEE coun-
tries, stricter overall EPL is not associated with higher a share of self-
employment (see Figure 1).2
As Table 2 shows, the proportion of regular (unlimited-term) contracts
is highest in Estonia (76 per cent), followed by Lithuania (63 per cent)
and Latvia (55 per cent). The unweighted average (65 per cent) is close to
the EU15 average (68 per cent). As these percentages affect the propor-
tion of the workforce enjoying protection against dismissals, Bertola et
al. (1999) present an adjusted EPL index multiplying the OECD strict-
ness index by the share of regular employment. Among the Baltic States,
the value of this index is highest in Estonia and lowest in Latvia. The
averages for the Baltic States and the EU15 are still similar.
Although overall EPL strictness should theoretically increase the share
of temporary employment, the OECD’s own data (1999) show the
relationship to be statistically insignificant. In the Baltic States, the
proportion of temporary contracts is in all cases above the EU average
(10 per cent), and double this figure in Latvia (where in addition the
proportion of workers on agency contracts is three times the EU average)
— despite the relatively strict regulation of temporary contracts there.
Somewhat puzzling is the positive relationship between the share of
temporary employment and the rigour of the relevant legislation in the
CEE countries (see right panel of Figure 1). This could well reflect the
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(1)
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FIGURE 1. Self-employment, Temporary Employment and EPL Strictness in
CEE Countries
Source: own calculations, European Foundation (2001), OECD (1999), Riboud
et al. (2002).
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poor enforcement of legislation in some of the CEE countries, in particu-
larly Latvia and Bulgaria, where the share of temporary employment is
the highest. It is also relevant that in the 1990s the legislation often
contained deficiencies, for example permitting the abusive use of success-
ive fixed-term contracts (only in Poland was this prohibited). Part-time
employment is also much less widespread in the CEE than the EU15,
though the proportion of involuntary part time employment increased in
Estonia from 42 per cent in 1993 to 51 per cent in 2002 (authors’ calcu-
lations based on Estonian Labour Force Survey, LFS).
The above analysis has been based only on one point of time. However,
longitudinal data on four countries (Estonia, Czech Republic, Poland,
Slovenia) presented by Casez and Nesporova (2001) did not reveal any
increase in temporary employment or tendency towards more flexible
forms of employment.
The frequency of different types of employment is just one measure of
the coverage of employment security laws. Dasgupta (2001) argues that
other relevant features are proportion of workforce in particular sectors,
age distribution, size of establishments covered by legislation, the
percentage of people covered by collective agreements and rate of union-
ization. Unions can monitor compliance with the law and help members
pursue legal complaints. In Latvia before 2002 the labour code did not
allow dismissals without the consent of the trade union. The rate of
unionization and the coverage of collective bargaining are both rather
low in the Baltic States: roughly 15 and 29 per cent in Estonia, 30 and 29
per cent in Latvia, 15 and 10–15 per cent in Lithuania, as against 44 and
78 per cent in the EU15 (Carley, 2002; EEAG, 2004). Low unionization
thus contributes to high labour market flexibility in the Baltic States.
Employer Estimates of EPL Strictness and the Problem of
Enforcement
Surveys of employers provide further information on labour market
flexibility, taking acount (at least to some extent) of the actual enforce-
ment of legal provisions. Managers consider not only the formal strict-
ness of laws, but also the extent to which official agencies actually enforce
them. We present here the data from the Global Competitiveness Report
(GCR) 2001, based on the executive opinion survey carried out by the
World Economic Forum. This asked whether ‘hiring and firing practices
by companies are determined by employers’ on a scale of 1 (‘strongly
disagree’) to 7 (‘strongly agree’); higher figures thus indicate higher flexi-
bility.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the OECD and GCR indices of
labour regulation. A negative correlation can be expected, because the
Eamets & Masso: The Paradox of the Baltic States
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OECD index measures EPL strictness and the GCR, flexibility. Despite of
the statistically significant correlation between the two indexes, a significant
portion of the variation in the GCR index is unexplained by the OECD
index, and this may well reflect variations in law enforcement. For the small
sample of CEE countries the relation seems even weaker and the variation
in GCR index compared to the variation in the OECD index is greater.
The average GCR index value is higher for CEE countries than for the
EU (4.5 and 3.1 respectively). Among the Baltic States, Estonia has the
most flexible hiring and firing practices (4.6), followed by Latvia (3.9) and
Lithuania (2.8). Though the OECD index shows slightly stricter legislation
in Estonia than the EU15, managers consider labour regulations more
flexible. Even more striking differences between the two indices can be
seen in Russia, where the OECD index shows stricter regulation than the
EU average (3.2 compared to 2.5), but the GCR index shows a high level
of flexibility (ranking 10 in the sample of 74 countries), which may indicate
poor law enforcement.3 The evidence confirms that labour markets can be
more flexible than appears when considering only formal legislation.
This demonstrates that it is vital to extend analysis from legal prescrip-
tion to enforcement procedures (inspectorates and court procedures).
There is considerable evidence of violations of EPL. Due to the focus of
the article, only violations of labour legislation are reviewed and viola-
tions of labour protection legislation are left aside. Reports by the
national labour inspectorates in the Baltic States4 show that violations are
discovered in roughly half the enterprises investigated (with a range
between 46 per cent of enterprises in Estonia and 61 per cent in Lith-
uania). These figures are likely to underestimate the extent of the
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(1)
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problem, since only a minority of firms are inspected in any year (37 per
cent in Estonia, 18 per cent in Lithuania, 7 per cent in Latvia). Surveys of
employees yield similar results: in a study in Latvia only 8.7 per cent of
employees reported that their employment rights were at least quite well
protected, and many complained of a variety of violations of labour laws
(Social Report, 2001).
There are parallels in other CEE countries; for example, 85 per cent of
private-sector employers in a Hungarian survey reported that they had
no serious constraints in dismissing workers (Kuddo, 1995). This means
that whereas employers in many west European countries need to intro-
duce ‘atypical’ employment contractual arrangements (temporary
contracts, agency employment) in order to attain flexibility, employers in
transition countries can often achieve the same result by simply
disregarding the legal regulations.
Though we do not have data by enterprise size, it is reasonable to
assume that EPL is particularly poorly enforced in small firms. Labour
inspectorates are likely to concentrate their resources on larger firms and
neglect SMEs, while in most countries the trade unions are either weak
or non-existent in small firms.5 Cazes and Nesporova (2001) show that
employees in larger establishments in transition economies have signifi-
cantly longer job tenure than those in smaller establishments. In many
countries, particularly those with relatively strict EPL (Germany, Italy,
Portugal), firms below a certain size (from 5 to 25 employees) are exempt
from some of the statutory provisions (Scarpetta et al., 2002). This is not
however the case in the Baltic States.
An important issue is how to evaluate the policy implications of labour
law violations in small enterprises. The OECD (2003) argues in favour of
better enforcement in the Baltic States on the grounds that when different
types of enterprise follow different rules, this distorts the functioning of
competition. Conversely, Burda (1998) regards the ability of small firms
to evade EPL in a positive light: small enterprises and new firms face
particular risks and often fail, and rules for example requiring compen-
sation for workers dismissed in adverse economic circumstances have a
serious disincentive effect and may force small firms out of business or
into the black economy.
Important evidence from a range of labour market surveys6 shows that
a minority of workers in the Baltic States have no written employment
contract: their conditions are only agreed verbally. According to the
WLB, the figure in Estonia 11 per cent in 1998 and 5 per cent in 2002; in
Latvia 8 and 10 percent, in Lithuania 13 and 5 per cent (Antila and
Ylöstalo, 1999 and 2002), showing some trend of improvement overall.
The LFS and NORBALT surveys give lower figures for the absence of a
written contract, approximately 4 per cent. Even though these numbers
are relatively small, such practices are clearly against the law, which insists
Eamets & Masso: The Paradox of the Baltic States
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on the agreement of a written contract. The incidence of this practice
varies across enterprises and regions. There is conflicting evidence on the
regional dimension: according to the WLB survey, in Estonia the lack of
a written contract is most frequent in Tallinn (14 and 7 per cent in 1999
and 2001), but according to the LFS data this situation is twice as frequent
in rural than in urban areas. This latter evidence is perhaps more
plausible. However in Latvia, verbal agreements were more widespread
in the capital region; in Lithuania that was true in 2002 but not in 1999.
For those with written employment contracts, protection against job
loss is often weakened by waiver clauses agreed with the employer (as
noted above) and also by the relatively common practice of many
employers to pay officially only a minimum wage but to supplement this
by unreported additional compensation. The consequence is that in case
of dismissal such employees are entitled to receive as compensation a
severance payment based only on the reported amount, not on the actual
wage, making termination of employment less costly for the employer.
According to the WLB survey, the share of employees sometimes receiv-
ing undeclared income in 1999 was 19 per cent in Estonia, 22 per cent in
Latvia, 12 per cent in Lithuania; in 2002 the figures had fallen to 10, 16
and 7 per cent, respectively (Antila and Ylöstalo, 2002). Those receiving
such income every month in 1999 amounted to 9, 8 and 3 per cent, respec-
tively. Almost certainly such survey responses understate the real
numbers receiving illegal payments; Antila and Ylöstalo (2002) suggest
that the figure may be two to three times those reported.
Procedures for the resolution of employment disputes vary across the
Baltic countries. In Estonia, such disputes may be settled either by special
commissions established by the local labour inspectorates, or by the
courts. The former are made up of representatives of both employees and
employers and are the first step in the settlement procedure; they are not
courts but a unique arrangement for solving employment disputes, intro-
duced because of the slow treatment of cases in courts. There is also
provision for mediation by the employees’ representative organization or
another authorized person, and for the establishment of a reconciliation
commission, but neither is commonly used (Masso and Philips, 2004).
Similarly in Lithuania, disputes may be heard by the courts or by an
enterprise-level commission for labour disputes consisting of employee
and employer representatives. In Latvia, according to the former Labour
Code, disputes were heard either by the courts or by employment dispute
commissions elected by the employers and the employees, the latter being
normally the compulsory first step in the process. The new Latvian
labour law in force since 2002 no longer mentions the dispute commis-
sions, but the new ‘labour disputes law’ specifies that individual rights
disputes are settled by negotiation, a labour dispute commission or by a
court. In all three countries, there are deadlines for appeals to the courts
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or commissions: in Latvia one month, in Lithuania three months
(formerly one month), and in Estonia four months.
Bertola et al. (1999) have noted that measuring the enforcement of EPL
is difficult as statistical information is relatively scarce and is seriously
affected by selection bias; and jurisprudence may be affected by under-
lying labour market conditions (for example, court rulings may become
more favourable to employees under tight labour market conditions).
With these caveats in mind, we may infer from the information presented
in Table 3 that in the Baltic States employees are relatively active in
submitting complaints to labour inspectors, and win a relatively high
percentage of cases. What is unclear from the statistics is whether this
indicates that the dispute resolution regime is relatively favourable to
employees, or simple that serious violations of the law are relatively
widespread in the first place. Also the limited court capacity may be the
problem. In the case of Latvia it has been noted that dispute resolution
with the assistance of labour dispute commissions or the courts is not
common (Social Report, 2001). A widespread problem in CEE countries
is that litigation in the courts over individual labour disputes is extremely
time-consuming (EIRO, 2003). In Hungary, more then 10 per cent of
cases last over a year; in Estonia between 2001 and 2003 there were similar
delays in 20 per cent of cases reaching the courts, while in labour dispute
commissions 1998 and 2003, 18–35 per cent of all sessions were post-
poned (Masso and Philips, 2004).
Though Bertola et al. (2002) concluded that in countries with a high
number of cases submitted to tribunals there was also a high percentage
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TABLE 3. EPL Enforcement
Year Complaints per 1000 Cases won by Strictness of
employeesa workers (%) dismissal criteriab
Latvia 2000 1.9 88 2
Lithuania 2000 2.2 68 1
Estonia 2000 5.4 65 2
Hungary 2000 6.2 n.a. 0
Slovenia 2000 6.4 n.a. 2
EU15 1995 2.1 50 0.9
USA 1995 0.2 48 0
Notes: a Number of cases at the first stage of the dispute resolution process (except
Hungary). In the Baltic States the number of cases reaching the courts is much lower
because commissions are the first step in the dispute resolution process.
b Definitions of strictness of legislation on unfair dismissals, based on OECD (1999):
0 = least restrictive, 3 = most restrictive.
Source: own calculations; Bertola et al. (1999), EIRO (2003), national inspectorates.
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of outcomes favourable to employees, this does emerge from the statis-
tics for the Baltic States. Strict legal constraints on unfair dismissal may
both encourage workers to appeal, and encourage employers to reach
agreement before a formal appeal, so there may be a contradictory causal
relationship between EPL stringency and the rate of appeals in the Baltic
States. Our conclusion, based on the limited empirical evidence on the
actual enforcement of EPL, is that the high level of appeals in Estonia in
particular is primarily attributable to the frequent violation of the regu-
lations.
Finally, we add that one reason for the weak enforcement of EPL is
workers’ poor awareness of their rights. For instance, though it is not
permitted for the terms of employment contracts or collective agreements
to be less favourable than those specified in the laws, Kallaste (2004) has
presented evidence that in a number of cases the provisions of collective
agreements fall below the legally prescribed standards.
Conclusion
The aim of this article was to estimate the strictness of EPL and the
enforcement of legal provisions in the Baltic States. EPL forms one
component of institutional labour market flexibility or rigidity, together
with trade unions and labour market policies, and it also affects micro-
level flexibility by reducing turnover in the labour market: both job
tenure and duration of unemployment tend to last longer with stricter
regulation.
The Baltic States have ratified the main international labour standards
as well as adopting most of the EU regulations on employment protec-
tion; the overall strictness of EPL is close to the EU average. However,
there cross-country differences also exist. Individual dismissals are more
constrained in Latvia than in Estonia and Lithuania, while in this respect
the index for all the Baltic States is higher than the EU average. On the
other hand, the use of temporary employment is less restricted in the
Baltic States than in the EU15, and even less so in Latvia than in Lith-
uania and Estonia. (Among the group of CEE countries, cross-national
variation is greatest in this area.) In all three Baltic countries the regu-
lation of collective dismissals is stricter than the average in the EU15 (this
is also true for the whole set of CEE countries). Despite differences in
most of the detailed indicators, overall EPL strictness seems to be not
very different across the Baltic States (though in Latvia, the regulations
are possibly more favourable to employers). Compared with other CEE
countries, EPL regulation in all three areas is slightly stricter in the Baltic
States; despite some differences they seem to constitute a relatively
homogenous group.
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From a formal point of view the legal regulation of the labour market
seems to be in place and the worker is not less protected in the Baltic
States than in EU15. But in practice, it appears that state regulations are
often disregarded in the private sector. There is considerable evidence of
violations of these regulations in enterprises in the Baltic States, and
workers’ complaints to labour inspectors are rather frequent and often
successful. This might indicate that law enforcement is not too weak; but
conversely, appeals may represent only a small proportion of all breaches
of the law. There are other reasons to believe that the number of unre-
ported violations is even higher, for example in many cases so-called
voluntary terminations of employment are in reality involuntary. There
is also considerable evidence of employees being obliged to waive some
of their rights to the benefit of the employer.
It is also important in evaluating the strictness of EPL to take account
of the proportion of the workforce that is actually covered by the regu-
lations. In the Baltic States the share of workers on unlimited contracts
is close to the EU15 level, but temporary employment is more wide-
spread (implying a higher level of flexibility). The positive correlation
between the share of temporary employment and the strictness of
relevant legislation in the CEE countries may reflect the poor enforce-
ment of legislation in some these countries. The latter may also be the
reason why employers’ evaluations of the flexibility of employment does
not match the strictness of formal legislation.
It is possible that in the future the gap between formal EPL and its
enforcement in the Baltic States may be narrowed, through a strengthen-
ing of the institutions responsible for implementing the regulations.
Increasing administrative capacity is likely to be reflected in a growth in
the efficiency of the judicial process in the courts. We can expect an
improvement in the operation of labour dispute commissions, and
enhanced awareness of workers about their rights. The trade unions,
which have participated actively in discussions on a new draft law on
employment contracts in Estonia (EIRO, 2004), may become more effec-
tive in defending employees’ statutory rights. If so, it is likely that labour
markets in the Baltic States will become more rigid. Nevertheless, it is
important to echo the argument of Bertola et al. (2000: 99) when consider-
ing possible policy implications: these ‘should not be based on any of the
indicators available to date’, since the data ‘are too imperfect and impre-
cise to inform the debate on EPL reforms and cannot be attached a norma-
tive content when monitoring structural reforms in the labour markets’.
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NOTES
1 The European Commission has noted that progress is needed in the
following areas: in Estonia, gender equality, prohibition of
discrimination, information and consultation of workers; in Latvia,
adopting directives on information and consultation of workers,
amending law on labour disputes, enforcing acquis in gender equality and
health and safety at work; and in Lithuania, transposing directives on
European Works Council, posting of workers, the right to information
and consultation of workers.
2 The results remain the same if Poland (which has the largest proportion of
agricultural employment in the CEE) is excluded from the sample. The
results are also similar when using figures for self-employment from Eurostat
(given in Cazes and Nesporova, 2003) rather than the EIRO survey.
3 Denisova et al. (1998) report that half of the disputes related to unfair
dismissals are not concluded within the deadline stipulated by the law.
4 Tööinspektsioon (www.ti.ee), Lietuvos Respublikos Valstybine· darbo
inspekcija (www.vdi.lt), Valsts darba inspekcija (www.vdi.lv).
5 According to Kallaste (2004) the Estonian LFS data show that in 1999,
workers in enterprises with up to 10 employees made up 25.7 per cent of all
non-unionized employees and only 9.1 per cent of union members.
6 The information originates from the following surveys: Statistical Office of
Estonia, Estonian Labour Force Survey (LFS) 1989–2003; Norwegian
Research Council, Living Conditions Study in Estonia 1994 and 1999 (part
of the survey NORBALT I and II, Living Conditions in the Baltic
Countries); Finnish Ministry of Labour, Working Life Barometer in the
Baltic Countries (WLB) 1999 and 2002; European Foundation, First
candidate countries survey on working conditions 2001.
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